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The March to Market  Reform in Central America
Laissez faire was planned.
po l a n y i (2001 [1944])
The market is omnipresent. Those outside the market might as well disappear. 
COLBURN AND CRUZ (2007)
Introduction
Market reform made deep inroads in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, 
with Central American countries among the regional leaders. Their market 
shift was noteworthy, given the strong statist features of these economies in 
the early 1980s. In Costa Rica, then Latin America’s solitary social democ 
racy, the state maintained a monopoly in the banking, electricity, and tele 
communications sectors, as well as a substantial national role in public health 
and education. Nicaragua had just undergone a revolutionary transition in 
1979, and the new Sandinista government controlled banking, foreign trade, 
and a large slice of agricultural production. A reform government in El Salva 
dor, attempting to forestall a revolutionary takeover, had also expanded state 
economic roles, with a banking takeover and a push for agrarian reform. Over 
the next twenty years, however, all three countries would experience a sharp 
shift toward the market.
Databases measuring policy reform permit a detailed analysis of the timing 
and sequencing of economic change. One of the first, by Morley, Machado, 
and Pettinato (1999), used annual data from 1970 to 1995 to construct a re 
form index for seventeen Latin American countries.1 Their scores indicate 
that Costa Rican economic policy shifted strongly toward a market model in
I
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1987, with marked liberalization in four of five economic arenas (trade, the 
domestic financial system, external capital transactions, and tax reform); only 
in privatization did it trail behind.
El Salvador’s reform effort fell behind the Latin American average in the 
second half of the 1970s and early 1980s. After the ARENA victory in the 
1989 presidential race, however, economic policy moved quickly in a neolib 
eral direction. Bank privatization occurred in 1990, followed by liberalization 
of capital accounts in 1991 and tax reform in 1992. With this spate of policy 
changes in the early 1990s, El Salvador surged ahead of Costa Rica as the re 
gion’s neoliberal leader.
Nicaragua moved against the regional tide during the 1980s, its decade of 
revolutionary government, and was not included in the Morley, Machado, 
and Pettinato data set. Economic collapse and the defeat of the Sandinistas 
in 1990, however, brought marked policy change under the subsequent Na 
tional Opposition Union (UNO) government. By the middle of the 1990s, 
Nicaragua had also undergone extensive market reform. An IDB assessment 
of Latin American structural reform for 1985-1999 by Eduardo Lora (2001), 
which includes data for Nicaragua for the 1994-1999 period, placed it above 
the Latin American average (see table l.l).2 In this framework, Nicaragua 
emerged as the leading reformer in Central America at the end of the 1990s, 
its high overall score driven by light financial and labor regulations. El Sal 
vador, though lagging on financial and labor reform, was among the Latin 
American leaders on trade liberalization and privatization, giving it an inter 
mediate place on this index in 1999. Even Costa Rica, where modest privati 
zation levels resulted in the lowest of the three scores, had liberalized substan 
tially across this fifteen-year period. Its 1999 score of .557 was far removed 
from its score of .306 in 1985.
Although each assessment uses a somewhat different measurement of 
structural reform, they all document a pro-market shift across time in this re 
gion? These countries began with numerous constraints on market processes; 
all of them ended this period with much more open economies. How can we 
explain the marked shift toward neoliberalism?
Market Reform Theory
Academic explanations of market liberalization commonly divide along three 
dimensions. The first division concerns the extent to which the primary im 
pulse for liberalization is traced to external as opposed to internal forces. Ana 
lysts emphasizing the role of external actors generally focus on the direct
Average
Table 1.1. Index of structural reform
Country 1985 1986 1987 1988 7989 1990 7997 7992 1993 1994 7995 7996 7997 7998 7999
Costa Rica .306 .387 .428 .421 .420 .425 .420 .440 .446 .453 .536 .533 .542 .557 .557
El Salvador .349 .353 .351 .348 .362 .399 .401 .416 .494 .505 .488 .497 .489 .572 .566
Nicaragua* .574 .574 .580 .623 .617 .598
Latin American .341 .360 .377 .384 .399 .436 .455 .484 .503 .522 .539 .548 .554 .573 .583
average1
Source: Lora (2001,30).
*Nicaragua was not included in this study until 1994.
t Average does not include the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
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or indirect impact of international financial institutions (the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank), powerful states directing them (the United 
States or G5 countries), or international capital. Conversely, explanations that 
focus on internal or domestic processes commonly highlight the role of tech 
nocratic officials in charge of lead economic ministries.
The second debate focuses on the competing roles of ideas versus material 
interests in advancing structural reform. Proponents of the ideological posi 
tion emphasize the impact of epistemic communities and norm entrepreneurs 
in shaping a value consensus in favor of market reform. Interpretations em 
phasizing material gain, in contrast, focus on the power of specific business 
interests to mold a favorable environment and extract rewards using tech 
niques such as marketing, lobbying or bribery.
The third debate explores the pivotal roles of political elites (a top down 
model) versus mass preferences (a bottom up model) in shaping neoliberal 
reforms. Whereas the former approach concentrates on elite negotiation and 
decision making, the latter focuses on public opinion and voting behavior to 
explain how popular pressure affects policy change.
The present study contends that much of the previous work on market 
reform casts the question too narrowly and fails to grapple with the inter 
sections among these various perspectives. My approach develops a multi 
phase theoretical framework that breaks the reform process into three parts 
and focuses on the shifting actors that dominate in each. The processes that 
catalyze and shape the first phase, reform initiation, differ from those that 
define the second, reform deepening, and the third, reform persistence. Reform 
initiation refers to the actions that introduce a sharp break from past prac 
tices and begin to move a country through the early stages of stabilization and 
structural reform. Reform deepening focuses on the layering in of additional, 
complementary policy changes that continue to advance marketization, as in 
ongoing tariff reduction, segmented privatization processes, or banking lib 
eralization. Reform persistence turns attention to the processes that hold re 
form in place across multiple administrations, as new norms and practices 
consolidate.
This study argues that external actors are critical agents during reform ini 
tiation, providing both financial resources to ease the process and detailed 
policy templates to chart the course. The government officials with whom 
they collaborate generally have little expertise or experience with the new ap 
proach; in this early stage, local authorities depend heavily on assistance from 
foreign donors and the multilateral lenders to launch the project.
As reform enters the deepening phase, domestic actors assume greater 
prominence. Local technocrats exercise leadership as norm entrepreneurs
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and ideational sponsors. Research centers and think tanks foster epistemic 
communities of market advocates who explain, implement, and legitimize 
ongoing reform. Business pioneers, some internationally networked, reorga 
nize investment and production around opening opportunities, and state- 
elite relations recalibrate. As economic activities shift, displacing previously 
privileged elites and forming a critical mass of new economic groups, business 
actors become important advocates of continuing reform.
In the final phase, reform persistence depends on broader political reorga 
nization. Pro-market political parties and coalitions present a steady sequence 
of reform candidates, and voters provide them with continuing support. At 
this point, public preferences for market reform play a critical role in explain 
ing the durability of the new arrangement, even in the face of episodic pro 
tests and strikes.
What follows is a review of market reform theory, which foregrounds the 
arguments embedded in a multiphase theoretical framework.
International Actors and Reform Initiation:
The IMF, Dominant States, and International Capital
Studies tracing market reform in developing countries commonly empha 
size the contributions of external actors, often focusing on the International 
Monetary Fund. During the 1980s debt crisis and in subsequent lending 
agreements, IMF advisers used leverage over vital resources to encourage the 
scuttling of state intervention and protectionist measures in favor of structural 
adjustment. A wide array of mechanisms (macro- and microconditionality, 
tranching, signaling to private creditors, de facto cross-conditionality, discre 
tionary waivers on benchmarks and targets, etc.) served to leverage and pace 
policy reform (Vreeland 2007; Stallings 1992; Kahler 1992).
Focusing just on nonconcessional loans to middle-income borrowers, Co- 
pelovitch (2010) identified 197 IMF loans to forty-seven countries between 
1984 and 2003. Lending occurred across time periods and regions, moving 
through the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the postcommunist 
transitions in the 1990s, and, after a period of decline and internal reform, 
with new energy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (Pop-Eleches 2009). 
Beginning with few specified conditions, the IMF loans came to include a 
large number of performance requirements accompanied by prolonged super 
vision. Vreeland (2007, 58) identified forty-nine countries with continuous, 
long-term (ten to twenty-one years) participation in IMF programs between 
1967 and 2000.
IMF lending tended to follow external financial crisis,4 but terms and con 
1
ditions varied, even when triggered by similar events. Significant differences 
in loan size, timing, and requirements prompted closer academic examination 
of lending politics, and competing explanations of Fund behavior emerged. 
One set of arguments concerned the extent to which IMF lending reflected 
the preferences of powerful IMF shareholder countries, which manipulated 
Fund decisions in pursuit of their own national interests.
Using statistical analysis of UN voting and IMF lending, and controlling 
for loan need, Strom Thacker (1999) determined that countries that shifted 
their voting patterns to favor positions that the U.S. State Department iden- 
t ified as important were more likely to receive IMF loans. This finding, sug 
gesting that the U.S. government used Fund resources to reward geopolitical 
allies, was supported by Randall Stone’s (2004) research on the link between 
U.S. foreign aid in Africa and Eastern Europe and IMF flexibility even in 
the event of noncompliance with loan conditions. Comparing IMF lending 
across time and regions (in Latin America during the debt crisis, in Eastern 
Europe during the postcommunist transition, and in Latin America during 
the 1990s), Pop-Eleches (2009) also found evidence of geopolitical influence 
on IMF behavior, at least in the Eastern European cases. Such findings are 
consistent with Realist theory, which assumes that powerful countries use ac 
cess to resources to increase their power and advance their strategic interests.
Alternative claims about international lending shifted the focus away 
from geopolitical interests of nation-states and highlighted the influence of 
powerful business groups (Cox 2008; Harvey 2005). William I. Robinson’s 
(2003), neo-Gramscian analysis employed the construct of a “transnational 
elite,” formed by a hegemonic bloc of global business leaders. This domi 
nant class was found to direct a “transnational state” comprising interna 
tional financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank, and regional development 
banks) along with critical state segments (the U.S. Treasury Department and 
USAID). Robinson described the emerging economic elite as deracinated, no 
longer headquartered in or privileging the North, but linked cross-nationally 
through corporate mergers, licenses, and subcontracts in ever-denser global 
networks. According to this argument, global elites used direct and indirect 
instruments to compel market openings and the elimination of national bar- 
tiers that constrain the international flow of capital and production. The re 
moval of impediments to capital and trade flows through market reform in 
turn facilitated the consolidation of transnationalized elite power.5
Structuralist arguments, which tend to assume homogeneity and dura 
bility of elite interests and uncomplicated control over national and interna 
tional institutions, are ill equipped to explain policy variation, inconsistency, 
and change over time. They can, however, capture a subterranean exercise of
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power and general convergence of elite interests. This theoretical approach 
is reinforced by some finely tuned quantitative studies that identified ways 
in which the needs of finance capital shaped the behavior of the IMF and 
its main shareholders. For example, Broz and Hawes (2006) demonstrate 
that U.S. congressional support for IMF bailouts tended to be stronger when 
large obligations to U.S. commercial banks were at stake. Mark Copelovitch s 
(2010) study of nonconcessionary IMF loans found that lending followed the 
combined preferences of G5 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Ger 
many, and Japan) countries, preferences that were shaped by the intensity and 
heterogeneity of G5 commercial bank exposure.
Some analysts of IMF lending question this approach and find the em 
phasis on the power of northern states and national financial interests to be 
overstated. Using principal-agent theory to explore the gap between the pref 
erences of powerful states that determine the Fund’s governing board and 
the policies pursued by the organization, a number of studies have inter 
preted the Fund as possessing some measure of autonomy.6 Much of this lit 
erature centers on how the norms and values that permeate the institution 
shift over time. Looking at a range of IMF and World Bank initiatives, in 
cluding debt and poverty relief and gender empowerment, Park and Vetter 
lein (2010) highlighted the role of ideas and nonmaterially powerful actors in 
the rise and fall of policy norms. This constructivist approach focused on the 
role of “norm entrepreneurs” who advanced policy change through a three- 
stage cycle of emergence, stabilization, and contestation. In a careful study of 
the changes in IMF policy positions, Chwieroth (2010) used data on profes 
sional training characteristics of over 400 IMF staff to explore the relation 
ship between different schools of thought in the economics profession, IMF 
recruitment patterns, and the rise and fall of Fund commitment to capital 
account liberalization between 1944 and 2009.
All of these approaches, whether emphasizing dominant countries, inter 
national economic forces, or the internal norms of international financial in 
stitutions, highlight the role of external actors in the advancement of neolib 
eral reform. An alternative approach centers on the impact of domestic actors.
Domestic Actors and Deepening Reform:
Technocrats and Business Elites
The ability of external actors to demand domestic economic policy changes 
like trade liberalization is obviously limited, even in poor countries histori 
cally influenced by the United States or international financial institutions. 
Except in times of crisis (and, arguably, even during crisis moments), the
1
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power of external financial agents to determine policy outcomes is normally 
constrained by the interplay of domestic forces (competing elite networks, 
institutional arrangements, bureaucracies, etc.). International lenders may 
provide a catalyst for reform initiation, but the layering in of market policies 
(policy deepening) and implementation of reform require internal actors to 
share leadership. Significant variation in the depth and durability of struc 
tural adjustment, in spite of the formulaic tendencies of the IMF, suggests 
the importance of local forces in this process (Kahler 1992; Vreeland 2007; 
Pop-Eleches 2009). As analysis shifts from understanding policy initiation 
to exploring policy implementation, retreat, durability, or amplification, the 
role of domestic actors assumes greater importance. Two sets of local actors 
have drawn close attention: domestic technocrats in key economic ministries, 
and business leaders, particularly those who dominate business associations.
A now-extensive body of literature explores the training and deployment 
of domestic technocrats in upper levels of administration and the ways in 
which they intersect with international agencies to promote an economic re 
form agenda (Edwards 1995; Dominguez 1997; Dezalay and Garth 2002; 
Golob 2003). With advanced foreign training in economics, planning, or 
other technical fields, these elites entered the government at high levels and 
provided a new ideological orientation to guide policy reform. Persuaded 
through mainstream academic training and research that economic objec 
tives (growth, efficiency, development) are best obtained through open mar 
kets, trade liberalization, and models emphasizing comparative advantage, 
these proponents used their positions in key government agencies to advance 
the cause of market reform through advocacy, persuasion, and intimidation. 
These officials were often aligned with and rotated into and out of key think 
tanks and universities, which, providing cultural capital and a salaried resting 
point between government appointments, assisted with recruitment, social 
ization, and legitimation.
Drawing on the cases of Mexico and Canada in the NAFTA negotia 
tions, Golob (2003) argues that the combination of exogenous shock and an 
internal legitimacy crisis created space for state leaders to redefine traditional 
policy frontiers” based on an emerging ideological consensus. She finds that 
the trade-policy shift in Mexico and Canada was not due to the rise of new 
economic sectors that used pluralistic pressures to advance this cause — not 
even in Canada, where political pluralism was more fully established. Instead, 
this decision was orchestrated by political leaders based on their own ideo 
logical alliances and following an abrupt economic downturn that delegiti- 
tnized preexisting approaches. This initiative was, in turn, heavily marketed to 
the public, where it took root (see also Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Sebastian
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Edwards (1995, 42) observed how key figures such as Pedro Aspe in Mexico 
and Domingo Cavallo in Argentina “became the core of technocratic reform 
teams that, from within the national bureaucracies, engineered the practical 
aspects of the transformation process.”
The pivotal role of this nucleus figures prominently in Waterbury’s (1992) 
work on the “change team” and Teichman’s (2001) on the “policy network,” 
a broader construct that also includes elected officials, business leaders, think 
tanks, and civil society representatives who contributed to neoliberal policy 
negotiations. By virtue of frequently shared academic credentials, techno 
cratic actors may be portrayed as emissaries of the international financial in 
stitutions with which they collaborate. However, in their study of developing 
human rights and neoliberal ideologies in Latin America, Dezalay and Garth 
(2002) challenged the notion of economic policy migration as simple diffu 
sion. Local actors, they found, exercised discretion over what they imported, 
and the process of reform domestication was affected by local conditions.
Confusion over the respective roles of internal and external technocrats 
is exacerbated by the tendency of some local authorities to ascribe reforms 
to the IMF, even when they were locally endorsed. Vreeland (2007, 62-67) 
identifies three reasons why domestic actors emphasize the role of the IMF 
in the reform process and minimize their own: blame, signaling, and lever 
age. Blame allowed domestic authorities to portray the IMF as responsible 
for policy reforms, which were sometimes unpopular, thus avoiding respon 
sibility and political penalty; signaling allowed local leaders to convey IMF 
approval of these reforms, thereby reassuring skittish foreign investment; and 
leverage allowed local officials to use IMF symbolism to push through re 
forms they desired when they did not have (or want to spend) the political 
capital required to secure approval, as when there were many veto players that 
could impede reform. In such cases, local technocrats could present a market 
reform as an externally imposed requirement when in fact they may have ac 
tively pursued the measure.
Studies of market reform that focus on technocratic-elite ideology com 
pete with a second body of domestically oriented analyses—those that high 
light the material interests at play in the business sector. Implicitly adopting 
the structuralist premise that stable states build up and around solid class 
coalitions, the latter explore the reshuffling of ties between the dominant 
political elite and the new class segments benefiting from market reform. 
The new economic model is understood to develop in close consultation with 
business elites (or an increasingly important subsector thereof) whose ma 
terial interests are advanced by the policy reforms. Whereas a traditional 
agroexport-based regime may develop in alliance with agrarian oligarchy, and
1
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a populist state may be constructed in alliance with domestic industrialists 
and corporatist labor organizations, the neoliberal state builds off an alliance 
with exporters, financial interests, and perhaps maquila assembly plant labor. 
A new equilibrium emerges as (particularly nontraditional) exporters and pri 
vate financial interests gain organizational momentum, economic leverage, 
and lobbying capacity. Using these resources, economic elites secure a policy 
framework and legal environment that allow them to further advance their 
interests.
Various studies of market reform highlight the role of domestic business 
groups in shaping the trade liberalization agenda (see, for example, Milner 
1988; Dur 2010). “Two-level game” analysis (Putnam 1988) of trade negotia 
tions examines deal making not simply between representatives of states who 
hammer out trade terms (Level I), but also between each government and its 
constituents at home (Level II), foremost among them the business lobbies 
that will be directly impacted by trade reform. In discussion of ten histori 
cal attempts at trade liberalization, Michael Lusztig (2004) identifies various 
conditions and government strategies that weaken business opposition and 
build business support. Interactions that transform “inflexible rent seekers” 
into “flexible rent seekers,” or diminish the power of the former while expand 
ing the influence of the latter, allow governing elites to minimize the political 
risks associated with eliminating protectionist policies. Detailed case studies 
of bargaining and consultative processes surrounding trade liberalization rou 
tinely demonstrate the active role of business lobbyists, whose support must 
be carefully cultivated (Thacker 2000; IADB, Munk Center for International 
Studies, and Inter-American Dialogue 2002; Fairbrother 2007).
Business elites have a wide repertoire of strategies they can deploy- 
individual and collective, formal and informal, associational and electoral—to 
advance their interests. The structural dependence of the state on capital gives 
the business sector enduring power, which political elites ignore at their peril. 
At the same time, the ability of business to exercise this influence depends on 
the extent to which they attenuate the differences among themselves through 
negotiation, persuasion, intimidation, or exclusion of weaker segments. Al 
though historically state-dependent and fragmented in many countries, Latin 
America’s business organizations often gained organizational capacity dur 
ing market transitions (Durand and Silva 1998). Complex multisectoral peak 
associations worked to unify the business voice and amplify its impact.
In Mexico and Chile, strong business associations were found to play a 
strategic role in crafting detailed provisions in NAFTA and in the Mercosur 
trade agreement (Schneider 2004, 221-230; Teichman 2001). Business rep 
resentatives, who were more expert in their industries than government offi 
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cials, actively collaborated in these negotiations, advancing recommendations 
on tariff schedules and timetables.7 In her study of Chilean free trade negotia 
tions, Bull (2008) found that business elites used control over not just capital 
but also knowledge to influence the shape of the trade text. The professional 
staff of business associations, some of whom rotated between private sector 
and government roles, blurred the distinction between public and private and 
helped to synchronize business and government positions.
Market reform deals both winning and losing hands to business elites, 
leading to fragmentation and organizational reconfiguration. Hierarchies 
among business groups with differential access to policy makers lead to policy 
reforms that favor particular interests over others. Detailed case studies of pri 
vatization in Latin America and Europe challenge conventional arguments 
about the ideological or technocratic base of privatization policy, even in neo 
liberal showcases like Pinochet’s Chile or Thatcher’s Britain, and frequently 
identify ways in which a handful of conglomerates gained privileged access to 
policy arenas and shaped particular reforms to their benefit (Schamis 2002; 
Manzetti 2009). Heilman (1998) notes the problem of “state capture” in post 
communist systems, in which insiders aligned with emerging economic inter 
ests to stall economic reforms at an equilibrium point that fell short of full 
transition, a strategy that allowed them to extract rents and noncompetitive 
benefits. The particular coalitional formation between state elites and eco 
nomic elites may direct the reform process to different benchmarks.
State and class coalition analysis draws attention not just to which sectors 
are included but also to which are excluded or expelled. Kurtz’s (2004) analysis 
of the impact of neoliberal reform on the solidarity structures of rural workers 
and peasants in Mexico and Chile suggests ways in which old alliances, once 
undermined, eroded quickly. Neoliberal reforms cut into the small farmer re 
source base and disrupted peasant organizational capacity, making it easier for 
the state to dismiss their claims—an argument that also extends to organized 
labor. As traditional state-society links deteriorated and new alliances were 
forged, domestic pressures built in favor of particular market reforms.
Political Dynamics and Reform Persistence:
Parties, Elections, and Public Opinion
Market reform, even when supported by technocratic-norm entrepreneurs 
and reconstituted business networks, may still be truncated and temporary. 
Since economic reform occurred in tandem with political liberalization in 
much of Latin America and Eastern Europe, its persistence would depend 
on voter preferences and electoral outcomes. Policy durability is affected by
1
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t he extent to which candidates and parties come to be identified with market 
opening and voters come to endorse their ascent.
Research on the impact of democratic political processes on the entrench 
ment of neoliberal reform may be divided between institutional analyses, 
which focus on formal electoral outcomes and processes, and work that em 
phasizes the shifting patterns of public opinion. Institutional analysis attends 
o the formal political processes that advance or constrain policy innova- 
ion, with attention to executive mandates, constitutional veto points, party 
coalitions and fragmentation, legislative behavior, formal decision-making 
rules, and electoral timing. The margin of victory in presidential elections and 
number of institutional checks on presidential power, for example, have been 
'ound to affect the pace and extent of economic reform (Haggard and Kauf 
man 1995; Pop-Eleches 2009), and the introduction of reform proposals early 
m an administration has also been found to improve their approval prospects 
(Frye and Mansfield 2004).
Advocates of a “bottom-up” model, in contrast, focus on the extent to 
which ordinary citizens come to view market reform as desirable. Empowered 
with the opportunity to select from among various candidates, citizens may 
endorse or oppose market reform and, in theory, replace leaders whose per 
formances disappoint them. According to this body of work, the durability 
md progressive advance of a market-based economic model in newly democ- 
: atized countries respond to rising popular preferences for the economic sta 
bility and wider consumer choices that these reforms deliver (Weyland 2002; 
Armijo and Faucher 2002; Baker 2009). In the end, it is the citizens them 
selves who evaluate the success of market reform and choose officeholders 
who conform to their preferences. Ongoing market reform, in this model, is 
ultimately driven by the positive assessments made by ordinary people.
Whereas some early analysis of market reform in Latin America suggested 
that these policies had limited mass support and frequently resulted from 
elite imposition or subterfuge (Stokes 2001), other studies identified bases of 
popular support, emphasizing public desire for either avoidance of loss or af 
firmation of gain. Much of this work builds on the robust finding that linked 
high levels of inflation with the introduction of market reform (Remmer 
1998; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004). Weyland (2002) explains shifts in public 
preferences regarding economic reform in Latin America in terms of “pros 
pect theory.” Faced with the prospect of severe economic loss, as under high 
inflation, people become less risk averse and more willing to accept changes 
whose outcomes are uncertain.
Findings about the power of hyperinflation to elicit support for market 
reform are echoed in Armijo and Faucher’s (2002) analysis of forces shap 
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ing reform in industrialized Latin American countries. Noting that ten out 
of the fourteen presidential elections held between 1983 and 2000 in Argen 
tina (pre-crisis), Brazil, Mexico, and Chile were won by pro-market candi 
dates, they conclude that the most significant factors explaining sustained 
marketization were pro-reform preferences of the general public and politi 
cal leaders.
Analyses drawing on survey research and public opinion polls permit 
clearer specification of the social base of reform. A large body of research 
ties support for market reform to education, finding that those with a higher 
level of education tend to be more pro-market (see, for example, Kalten- 
thaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004). Much of this literature implicitly draws 
on a human-capacity hypothesis; better-educated people who have skills and 
resources needed to successfully compete in a market economy favor its adop 
tion, whereas those with less education recognize their vulnerabilities and are 
more resistant to market transformations.
While this literature offers suggestive insights about variations in popu 
lar views, it has limited ability to explain why reform support might sweep 
through a society, even in countries where the general educational levels are 
low. Baker (2009) develops an alternative consumption-based theory of mar 
ket reform. Using Latinobarometro data on public opinion in eighteen Latin 
American countries, he argues that support for trade liberalization soon 
became widespread and multiclass and far surpassed opposition to it. He 
concludes that respondents tended to approach trade from a consumption 
perspective (consumismo), where they could see a direct link to lower-cost im 
ports, rather than from an employment perspective, where the connections 
between trade liberalization and job loss were less apparent.
As we will see in the course of this book, debate continues about the 
intersection between popular attitudes and market reform. Acceptance of 
neoliberal policy was hardly uniform, as ongoing protests and social justice 
campaigns attest. Nor did public approval necessarily arise spontaneously. En 
dorsement was sometimes accompanied by a hard-selling campaign designed 
to achieve that result; public attitudes toward trade reform have been linked 
to marketing and manipulation (MacArthur 2000), with resulting volatility. 
Even among those who affirm support, internal inconsistencies in market 
perceptions have been identified, with privatization eliciting more negative 
reactions than trade (Baker 2009; Baker and Greene 2011). Many analysts 
have also noted the onset of “reform fatigue” (Lora and Panizza 2003) as ini 
tial gains fade and costs became more apparent. When economic conditions 
stabilize, the propensity to accept additional reforms may decline, explaining
1
why former supporters of reform may subsequently reverse course, even if re- 
tor m has brought improvement.
Detailed case studies, while not representative of the universe of reform, 
can help us understand subregional variations in reform processes and clarify 
particular policy sequences. They also help us tackle the conundrum of why 
people might endorse market reforms that seem suboptimal or even adverse 
to their interests. What follows is theoretically informed process tracing of 
market reform in three Central American countries, moving through initia 
tion to deepening and concluding with an assessment of reform persistence 
on the eve of the CAFTA negotiations.
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Central American Market Reform
Case studies of market reform in Central America allow us to identify the 
actors and processes that shaped economic restructuring in the region. Each 
country had a distinct historical-institutional profile, and reform processes 
varied along key dimensions. Costa Rica entered into reform via a debt crisis, 
and policy changes were negotiated piecemeal through a well-institutionalized 
democracy. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, in contrast, market transi 
tions were driven by economic disarray, institutional weakness, and political 
polarization associated with revolutionary struggle and war.
In spite of these differences, structural and geopolitical similarities cre 
ated important parallels in the region. These countries were not hermetically 
sealed; reform processes in one urged reform in others as cross-regional capi 
tal mobility and competition played out across this well-networked landscape. 
In that sense, one of the fundamental assumptions of comparative politics— 
that each unit is discrete—is not fully operative; the tools of international 
political economy, which explore the larger framework within which coun 
tries are embedded, provide crucial assistance.
Careful analysis of these neoliberal transition processes permits the se 
quencing of reform phases and fuller specification of the actors involved at 
each stage. This analysis concludes that reform initiation depended on ex 
ternal funders, with USAID playing a leading role, subsequently reinforced 
by the IMF and other international lenders. Their catalytic impact required 
the cooperation of key state leaders who, during a time of economic crisis, 
took guidance from the external donors. The deepening of reform depended on 
the active participation of technocratic leaders and the construction of insti 
tutional infrastructure (public and private agencies, research centers, think
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tanks) that facilitated recruitment and legitimation of reform ideas. Tech 
nocrats received assistance from an expanding network of market-oriented 
economic elites, who reshaped business associational life and sought reform 
adjustments. Finally, xhz persistence of reform across administrations required 
not just business adaptation but public support, as evidenced by electoral vic 
tories of pro-market candidates and parties across the period. (Appendix 2 
provides an overview of the 1978-2011 presidential election results in these 
three countries.)
Although the case study method does not allow generalization beyond 
the countries analyzed here, this approach suggests several lines of inquiry 
that can inform future research. In what follows, these cases are discussed in 
the order that their market reform processes unfolded, beginning with Costa 
Rica and ending with Nicaragua.
Market Reform in Costa Rica
During the 1970s, the Costa Rican economy deployed a variant of Latin 
America’s reigning import-substituting industrialization model (Hidalgo 
2003; Monge and Lizano 1997; Wilson 1998). By comparison with many 
other countries in the region, the ownership role of the Costa Rican state 
was relatively modest, and activism was concentrated in the social-service 
sector through the provision of health and educational services. Nonetheless, 
the state did control several core economic activities, the most important 
of which were in energy and telecommunications and the banking system, 
which had been nationalized in 1948. State-owned companies were managed 
by the Costa Rican Development Corporation (CODESA), a holding com 
pany formed in 1972, which included fourteen companies at its peak (Edel 
man 1999, 64-65; Wilson 1998,101). The state also created a growing number 
of autonomous institutions (AIs), with thirty-six new AIs established in the 
1960s and fifty added in the 1970s (Edelman 1999, 61). Local industry was 
encouraged and protected by a series of tariff and nontariff barriers much like 
those prevailing elsewhere in the region.8
Rising petroleum prices in the 1970s hit the economy hard, but easy for 
eign borrowing allowed leaders to postpone adjustments. By 1980, the bud 
get deficit reached 8% of GDP (IMF 1998,16). External debt stocks, already 
59% of gross national income (GNI) in 1980, rose to 165% in 1982? In 1983, 
the per capita debt was the second-highest in Latin America (Korten 1997, 
34). The Carazo administration (1978-1982), facing the collapse of the Cen 
tral American Common Market (CACM), which had absorbed 80% of Costa 
Rica’s manufactured exports, declared a debt moratorium and defaulted in
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July 1981. The inflation rate soared to 90% the following year.10 As economic 
conditions deteriorated, the government signed a stabilization agreement 
with the IMF, but the country immediately fell out of compliance (Newton 
et al. 1988).
During the Luis Alberto Monge administration (1982—1986), special U.S. 
foreign policy interests in the region brought increased attention and finan 
cial flows. The Reagan administration’s geopolitical concern about “commu 
nist” expansion fueled hostility to the newly installed Sandinista government 
in neighboring Nicaragua, which was perceived as a Soviet ally and national 
security threat. With administration officials eager to stabilize Costa Rica and 
showcase a successful democratic market alternative in the region, U.S. eco 
nomic assistance to Costa Rica more than tripled between 1981 and 1982, and 
then quadrupled to $214 million in 1983 (see table 1.2). U.S. aid to Costa Rica 
averaged 4% of GDP for the critical 1983-1987 market-transition period.
As controversy over Central America policy flared in the United States, 
a special bipartisan commission chaired by former secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger proposed a five-year, $1.2 billion annual aid program for the re 
gion. Labeled “the Sandinista windfall” in a 1998 USAID retrospective on 
the Costa Rica aid program, real average annual USAID funding for Costa 
Rica in 1982-1995 increased sixfold over the 1973-1981 levels (Fox 1998,17). 
This assistance proved a catalyst to a market reform process that carried across 
subsequent administrations. In all, U.S. economic aid to Costa Rica totaled 
over $1.4 billion between 1982 and 1995 (see table 1.2).
Official development assistance, over 90% of which came from the United 
States, equaled 25% of general government spending in 1983-1985 (Sauma 
and Trejos 1999, 353). U.S. funds were used for balance of payments sup 
port, covering the dollar costs of private sector imports, with the importers’ 
local currency payments used to support a series of mutually agreed upon re 
form projects. According to USAID evaluations and reports, priorities in 
cluded CODESA enterprise divestiture, promotion of nontraditional exports, 
and the construction of a network of new public and quasi-private institu 
tions that would become internal advocates for further market transition (Fox 
1998; Newton et al. 1988).
The new institutional framework included the Costa Rican Investment 
Promotion Agency (CINDE) and the Foreign Trade Ministry (COMEX). 
CINDE, created in 1983, provided a convergence space for pro-reform policy 
elites to coordinate recommendations with representatives from domestic and 
multinational firms. This agency prepared proposals promoting foreign in 
vestment and exports and lobbied elected officials to secure passage. Dur 
ing its first five years of operation, CINDE was entirely funded by USAID,

























1980 15.9 0.3 58.3 1.6 38.7 1.8
1981 15.2 0.6 113.9 3.3 59.9 2.4
1982 51.8 2.0 182.2 5.4 6.3 0.3
1983 214.1 5.4 245.5 7.0 0.0 0.0
1984 169.8 3.7 215.9 5.9 0.1 0.0
1985 220.1 4.6 434.0 11.4 0.0 0.0
1986 162.7 3.0 322.6 8.6 0.0 0.0
1987 181.2 3.1 462.9 11.7 0.0 0.0
1988 120.6 2.0 314.2 7.5 0.4 0.0
1989 122.3 1.8 307.3 7.0 3.9 0.4
1990 95.5 1.3 246.9 5.1 224.5 22.2
1991 45.2 0.6 228.0 4.3 219.4 14.7
1992 27.0 0.3 274.0 4.6 76.6 4.3
1993 27.8 0.3 215.1 3.1 152.5 8.7
1994 12.2 0.1 57.0 0.7 95.6 3.2
1995 6.3 0.1 63.3 0.7 32.7 1.0
1996 2.2 0.0 78.5 0.8 27.7 0.8
1997 0.4 0.0 31.8 0.3 28.1 0.8
1998 1.2 0.0 42.5 0.4 56.5 1.6
1999 2.3 0.0 60.2 0.5 100.0 2.7
2000 2.1 0.0 44.4 0.3 33.9 0.9
2001 3.1 0.0 132.3 1.0 66.4 1.6
2002 3.0 0.0 143.5 1.0 53.6 1.3
2003 4.7 0.0 57.9 0.4 65.8 1.6
Source: USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov, 
accessed July 11,2011.
Note: Calculations based on GDP (current US$) from World Bank, World Development Indica 
tors (WB/WDI), http://databank.worldbank.org, accessed July 11,2011.
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vhich provided grants, between 1983 and 1994, totaling $70 million (Robin 
son 2003, 139).11 USAID also supported the creation of COMEX, which 
emerged from modest beginnings as a program within the president’s office 
co form a separate trade ministry with a full professional staff.
International financial institutions soon returned to sign a series of agree 
ments that pulled the Costa Rican economy in a market direction. The IMF 
provided six loans for Costa Rica between 1985 and 1995, which together 
contained thirty-four performance criteria and fifty-six total conditions (Co 
pelovitch 2010, 321). These loans were coordinated with the World Bank and 
he Paris Club (bilateral lenders) through a system of cross-conditionality, 
m which approval of one became a condition for approval by others.12 Three 
structural adjustment programs (PAE) developed between 1985 and 1995 
provided clear financial and normative incentives to local policy makers to 
redirect the economy along market lines.
The first agreement, PAE I, signed by the Monge administration with the 
‘ Vorld Bank in 1985, entailed a commitment to launch privatization and re 
duce state spending. Following a drop in USAID funding during the Arias 
administration (1986-1990), PAE II was signed with the World Bank in 1988 
ior $200 million to strengthen the state’s fiscal capacity; cut state subsidies for 
uublic services, agricultural price supports, the petroleum refinery, and rail 
roads; and promote nontraditional exports while further reducing trade bar 
kers. Additional debt relief came under the Bush administration’s 1989 Brady 
Plan, with a Paris Club arrangement allowing Costa Rica to buy back 64% 
Tits $1.6 billion external debt at a discounted rate of 16 cents on the dollar 
Booth 1998,164). Consolidating this phase of trade reform, Costa Rica be 
came a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
:990.
PAE III, a $150 million loan package from the World Bank and the IMF, 
vvas negotiated in 1994-1995 during the Figueres Olsen administration 
1994-1998). This agreement pushed for deeper reforms and proved more 
conflictual (Weisleder 2004, xxiii-xxv). Lacking the party majority in the 
egislature that was held by his National Liberation Party (PLN) predeces 
sors, Monge and Arias, and by Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) presi 
dent Calderon (1990-1994), Figueres Olsen found it more difficult to secure 
legislative support. With IMF and IDB agreements calling for a sharp cut in 
public sector jobs and major tax increases, this negotiation triggered a month 
long teachers’ strike in 1995 and violent protests in Limon in 1996 (Booth 
1998,165).
Although the legislature ultimately approved the loan, the World Bank
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canceled its part of the package when the government proved unable to reach 
an agreement with the IMF. The IDB came through in 1995 with a series of 
loans totaling $250 million after an IMF agreement was reached (Edelman 
1999, 81). With the economic crisis waning and regional politics normalizing 
in Nicaragua and El Salvador, Costa Rica moved out of the phase of “tutored 
reform” under international management (Sojo 2004), and the market reform 
process slowed, as the structural reform index in table 1.1 suggests.
Reform repeatedly elicited resistance, both in the legislature and on the 
streets, and the results did not converge with an orthodox neoliberal model 
The state still played an important role in the national economy, and the 
Costa Rica variant of neoliberal reform retained several heterodox features, 
including a substantial state-run social service sector (Seligson and Martinez 
2010). Even after the gradual opening to private competition, state banks 
continued to dominate the banking sector. The state also controlled sugar 
commercialization, petroleum imports, insurance, telecommunications, and 
energy distribution. Economic “distortions” connected to the ISI model were 
temporarily replaced by new ones associated with export promotion to ease 
the transition.13
Nonetheless, Costa Rica had launched a significant process of structural 
reform. The Wall Street /tfz/rzztf//Heritage Foundation Index for Economic 
Freedom, which includes a corruption indicator, placed Costa Rica among 
the regional leaders in market liberalization (www.heritage.org/index/expl 
ore). With an overall score of 67 in 2003 (based largely on its high fiscal and 
trade freedom and low corruption scores), Costa Rica was ranked fifth in 
Latin America, behind Chile (76), El Salvador (71.5), Uruguay (69.8), and 
Panama (68.4).
New economic space was created under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the 
Reagan administration’s unilateral U.S. market opening for exporters from 
the region. Established to counter revolutionary agitation and deepen mar 
ket connections, the CBI eased access to the U.S. market for nontraditional 
exporters in Central America. Costa Rica responded strongly, and nontradi- 
tional agricultural and industrial exports increased quickly. Costa Rica’s ex- 
port processing zone (EPZ) regime provided investors with 100% tax ex 
emption for eight years and 50% for the following four (PNUD 2003, 133). 
From 56 companies producing 6.5% of exports in 1990, the country’s EPZs 
expanded to 229 businesses, generating over 47% of exports in 2001 (PNUD 
2003,129).
External actors played a critical role in advancing this market reform, with 
USAID, for geopolitical reasons, taking the lead and working in close col 
laboration with the IMF and the World Bank. But restructuring could ad 
I
vance only with the active cooperation of domestic economic policy makers. 
A new team of technocrats, appointed by President Monge to fill the Cen 
tral Bank presidency and the major economic ministerial positions in 1984, 
provided local management for the policy shift. Initially appointed to in 
crease the confidence of foreign lenders during a period of economic difficulty 
(Church and Loria-Chaves 2004, 8), this cohort, which centered on the new 
Central Bank president, Eduardo Lizano Fait, expanded into an array of offi 
cial roles.14 Lizano served as Central Bank president in parts of four admin 
istrations (Monge, Arias, Rodriguez, and Pacheco) between 1984 and 2002, 
and he worked closely with the IMF and the IDB, subsequently serving as an 
IMF governor in 2000-2001. The “chief architect and lobbyist” for liberal 
ization measures (Nelson 1990, 187), Lizano collaborated with like-minded 
economists to change the dominant economic ideas.15
According to Lizano, the pretransition Costa Rican economy was riddled 
by distortions and rent-seeking practices. At a USAID-funded conference 
hosted by Costa Rica in June 1991 and attended by prominent neoliberal 
theoreticians and practitioners from the United States, Chile, Mexico, and 
Costa Rica, Lizano concluded the following (1992, 173): “For several de 
cades, the Costa Rican economy was characterized by the growing creation of 
rents that benefited specific groups of producers and certain labor groups. This 
collection of measures was embodied in laws, regulations, norms, and provi 
sions of a widely varying nature, such as subsidies, exonerations, controls and 
prohibitions. All of this made the Costa Rican economy highly distorted.” 
Recommending a strict free market approach, including “severe penalty” for 
entrepreneurs who failed to adapt, Lizano concluded, “If there is not enough 
competition, entrepreneurs get drowsy. Only competition obligates them to 
sleep with their eyes open” (176).
Lizano further argued that economic freedom was integral to the cause of 
liberty in much the same way as political freedom, and that each depended 
on the other. This forceful pro-market outlook came to reign in various Costa 
Rican think tanks and research centers, particularly those like CINDE and 
the Academia de Centroamerica, which had been established with USAID 
funding.16 These centers gave resident economists consulting opportunities 
and a “resting point” between stints of government or quasi-public service 
(Church and Loria-Chaves 2004; Blanco Lizano 2010,166-171).
With Eduardo Lizano as president, the Academia de Centroamerica 
played a pivotal role generating and diffusing market professionalism. It be 
came a “concept center” for market-norm entrepreneurship, deliberately fo 
cused on creating an epistemic community and preparing a network of emerg 
ing economists for graduate work in the United States and Chile (Lizano
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canceled its part of the package when the government proved unable to reach 
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1999, 81). With the economic crisis waning and regional politics normalizing 
in Nicaragua and El Salvador, Costa Rica moved out of the phase of “tutored 
reform” under international management (Sojo 2004), and the market reform 
process slowed, as the structural reform index in table 1.1 suggests.
Reform repeatedly elicited resistance, both in the legislature and on the 
streets, and the results did not converge with an orthodox neoliberal model, 
The state still played an important role in the national economy, and the 
Costa Rica variant of neoliberal reform retained several heterodox features5 
including a substantial state-run social service sector (Seligson and Martinez 
2010). Even after the gradual opening to private competition, state banks 
continued to dominate the banking sector. The state also controlled sugar 
commercialization, petroleum imports, insurance, telecommunications, and 
energy distribution. Economic “distortions” connected to the ISI model were 
temporarily replaced by new ones associated with export promotion to ease 
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ket connections, the CBI eased access to the U.S. market for nontraditional 
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expanded to 229 businesses, generating over 47% of exports in 2001 (PNUD 
2003,129).
External actors played a critical role in advancing this market reform, with 
USAID, for geopolitical reasons, taking the lead and working in close col 
laboration with the IMF and the World Bank. But restructuring could ad 
vance only with the active cooperation of domestic economic policy makers. 
A new team of technocrats, appointed by President Monge to fill the Cen 
tral Bank presidency and the major economic ministerial positions in 1984, 
provided local management for the policy shift. Initially appointed to in 
crease the confidence of foreign lenders during a period of economic difficulty 
(Church and Loria-Chaves 2004, 8), this cohort, which centered on the new 
Central Bank president, Eduardo Lizano Fait, expanded into an array of offi 
cial roles.14 Lizano served as Central Bank president in parts of four admin 
istrations (Monge, Arias, Rodriguez, and Pacheco) between 1984 and 2002, 
and he worked closely with the IMF and the IDB, subsequently serving as an 
IMF governor in 2000-2001. The “chief architect and lobbyist” for liberal 
ization measures (Nelson 1990, 187), Lizano collaborated with like-minded 
economists to change the dominant economic ideas.15
According to Lizano, the pretransition Costa Rican economy was riddled 
by distortions and rent-seeking practices. At a USAID-funded conference 
hosted by Costa Rica in June 1991 and attended by prominent neoliberal 
theoreticians and practitioners from the United States, Chile, Mexico, and 
Costa Rica, Lizano concluded the following (1992, 173): “For several de 
cades, the Costa Rican economy was characterized by the growing creation of 
rents that benefited specific groups of producers and certain labor groups. This 
collection of measures was embodied in laws, regulations, norms, and provi 
sions of a widely varying nature, such as subsidies, exonerations, controls and 
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Recommending a strict free market approach, including “severe penalty” for 
entrepreneurs who failed to adapt, Lizano concluded, “If there is not enough 
competition, entrepreneurs get drowsy. Only competition obligates them to 
sleep with their eyes open” (176).
Lizano further argued that economic freedom was integral to the cause of 
liberty in much the same way as political freedom, and that each depended 
on the other. This forceful pro-market outlook came to reign in various Costa 
Rican think tanks and research centers, particularly those like CINDE and 
the Academia de Centroamerica, which had been established with USAID 
funding.16 These centers gave resident economists consulting opportunities 
and a “resting point” between stints of government or quasi-public service 
(Church and Loria-Chaves 2004; Blanco Lizano 2010,166-171).
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2005). The Academia’s educational outreach included monthly information 
sessions for “junior economists” who wanted to engage with peers and con 
tinue their education; journalists covering business and financial news; and 
legislative staff members seeking to deepen their understanding of economic 
affairs. It awarded cash prizes to junior economists participating in essay com 
petitions and to journalists for outstanding coverage of economic news. It 
also set up virtual help centers for journalists and clergy members who had 
inquiries about economic issues. These programs allowed a network of clas 
sically trained economists to disseminate a market-friendly orientation to 
economic issues and to reach a broad segment of opinion makers in Costa 
Rican society. Following the leveraging pattern identified by Vreeland (2007, 
62-67), local technocrats also urged external funders to withhold resources 
in order to extract reforms and, well-positioned to understand the pressure 
points and timing of domestic political deliberations, helped identify strategic 
moments at which to act (Wilson 1998).
External actors collaborated with domestic technocrats to advance the new 
model, but, as structuralist analysis suggests, the durability and deepening of 
market reform would depend on the way it resonated with the local class 
structures. As industrialists producing for a local and/or Central American 
market were displaced by the new emphasis on nontraditional products for a 
global market, the privileged position of that historically favored class frag 
ment eroded. An innovative business subsector would have to develop quickly 
around the new economic model, or its durability would be jeopardized.
An emerging coalition of new exporters and financial interests helped to 
consolidate the transition, broadening elite support for market reform. The 
change was facilitated by its steady but gradual nature and by the availability 
of transition support, which gave exporters time to shift to new products or 
expand markets into new terrain. Over the course of twenty years, some agri 
cultural producers, for example, were able to reconfigure their crop allocations 
or adjust their production and shipping practices to gain entry into nontradi 
tional markets.17 Some local firms entered joint ventures or licensing agree 
ments with transnational corporations and adapted operations accordingly.
In his study of the local stock market and firm-level growth, Diego 
Sanchez-Ancochea (2005, 697-704) identified three major changes in the 
Costa Rican business sector during the 1980s and 1990s: the concentration 
of capital in the largest domestic firms; expansion into the Central American 
and Mexican markets; and increasing ties with foreign investors and trans 
national corporations. The opening to private banking created new oppor 
tunities for local entrepreneurs (Robles Rivera 2010, 105) and attracted re 
gional and international financial investors, with Nicaraguan and Salvadoran
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banks among the ten largest private banks in Costa Rica in 2003 (Sanchez- 
Ancochea 2005, 703).
Economic groups began to organize politically, ultimately creating an 
activist network of business associations. Several of the established business 
chambers initially resisted market reform, concerned about the loss of pro 
tection. Pro-market technocrats engaged in “a little social engineering” and 
worked with emerging exporters and bankers to create a new set of specialized 
business chambers (Lizano 2005; see also Lizano 1999, 170-172). Gradu 
ally, traditional chambers like the Costa Rican Chamber of Industry (CICR) 
underwent major internal changes, with a new emphasis on competitiveness 
and quality controls as the industrial sector strengthened its export capabili 
ties. The business peak association,18 the Costa Rican Union of Private Sec 
tor Chambers and Associations (UCCAEP), expanded to include 43 cham 
bers by 2005, many in new economic sectors. Membership in the American 
Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica (AMCHAM-Costa Rica) mush 
roomed to 400 Costa Rican and U.S. companies in 2005, reportedly repre 
senting 80% of U.S. foreign investment (Denton, July 8, 2005).
As the new business networks emerged, labor and the peasant sector suf 
fered reversals. Organized labor in Costa Rica was concentrated in the public 
sector, and the contraction of the state in the 1980s and 1990s cut into the 
unionized workforce. By 2000, organized labor represented only 10% of the 
workforce, down from 15% in 1995 (PEN 2001, 209). New industrial jobs, 
many of which were located in the EPZs, generally were organized in soli 
darity associations, not unions, with limited capacity to press sectoral de 
mands (Mosley 2008). More traditional business elites, particularly those in 
declining sectors, approached reform with skepticism (Colburn and Sanchez 
2000, 53-67) but were losing the ability to influence the private sector politi 
cal voice.
In the rural sector, the organizational capacity of small and medium-sized 
agricultural producers (and even large ones in the less successful parts of the 
economy) eroded over time. As the traditional agricultural economy declined, 
farmers responded with a surge of protests, and protective tariffs stabilized 
in the agricultural sector after 2000.19 Many small producers, however, failed 
to flourish in a more competitive environment. Some peasant organizations 
became shells almost overnight, although led by feisty leaders whose passion 
ate commitment and internal struggles led them to invent and reinvent their 
movements (Edelman 1999, 2008). As the portion of the population em 
ployed in agriculture continued its steady fall and the regime became more 
deeply committed to neoliberal practices, ongoing protection of the agricul 
tural sector came under question.20
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The economic and organizational consolidation of new business sectors in 
banking, EPZ, tourism, and nontraditional exports, combined with the ero 
sion of public sector unions and small farmers associations, provided sectoral 
grounding for the economic policy shift. But in an open political system, like 
that found in Costa Rica, citizens and voters have the final say. Public support 
for economic restructuring (as opposed to stabilization) may be limited at the 
outset due to transition costs and uncertainties. Unless voters acquiesce to on 
going change, the turnover of elected officials could soon detain transition. In 
Costa Rica, parties and officials associated with restructuring repeatedly won 
reelection or were replaced by others that shared this commitment. Although 
weak party discipline meant that presidents could not assume uniform sup 
port from their party’s legislative bench or from the national party leadership, 
they strengthened their hold on the government through an increasing use of 
executive decrees and regulations.21
The historically dominant PLN enjoyed two additional circumstances in 
the 1980s that helped it launch an economic transition. For the first time, 
the party won two terms in a row with an outright majority of the vote. The 
victory margins, with Monge s 58.8% of the vote in 1982, followed by Arias’ 
52.3% in 1986, were historically unprecedented (Booth 1998, 67); previously, 
party victories had tended to rotate between parties and coalitions. Second, 
although the PLN lost the elections in 1990, 1998, and 2002, the Center- 
Right PUSC also endorsed the restructuring agenda, and a new elite consen 
sus emerged around what Cornick and Trejos (2009,155) called “the sensible 
center.” Indeed, the overlap in PLN and PUSC positions on economic reform 
was such that critics began using the “PLUSC” label to suggest that these 
parties had merged.22
Electoral outcomes are based on many factors, only some of which are re 
lated to candidate and party policy positions; assumptions about public pref 
erences for particular economic models based simply on election results may 
be questioned. In fact, PLN leaders initially obfuscated the party’s deepening 
embrace of the market, as a segment of the leadership began to redefine the 
party’s economic orientation (Wilson 1999). Over time, however, the PLN 
position of economic globalization and domestic reform became clearer, and 
voters still returned its leaders to power.
Taken together with information derived from public opinion polls, these 
electoral results are suggestive. Further evidence of public support for mar 
ket reform during this juncture emerges from the annual eighteen-country 
Latinobarometro polls. Poll results are sometimes volatile and contradictory, 
but they can also capture changing preferences. The present study focuses on 
one broad question and follows the responses across time and cross-nationally.
The March to Market Reform 43
Asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement, “The market 
economy is best for the country,” three-fourths (76%) of respondents in Costa 
Rica answered affirmatively (strongly agree or agree) in 1998. After fifteen 
years of accumulated reform, public acceptance of a market economy was 
strong in Costa Rica, topping the Latin America average of 66% by ten per 
centage points at that time (Latinobarometro 2009, 91).
Adjustment had caused some pain, and growth had slowed in 1981-1989 
to an average annual 2.4%. But in the 1990s, growth resumed, averaging 4.7% 
in 1990-1997 and an even stronger 4.8% in 1998-2003 (ECLAC, 2010d, 53). 
New sectors had emerged, as seen with the rapid growth of tourism and the 
free trade zones, capped by the 1996 INTEL announcement of a $300 million 
high-tech investment in Costa Rica. The country’s two major political parties 
had converged around a new model, which had trimmed the state sector and 
deepened Costa Rica’s integration into the global market. And public accep 
tance of the shift, while neither uniform nor unconditional, as we shall see, 
was widespread.
Market Reform in El Salvador
As Costa Rica underwent debt crisis and structural reform, El Salvador was 
descending into civil war. Before the peace accord was signed in 1992, an 
estimated 75,000 people would die (1.8% of the population) (Wood 2003, 8). 
Conflict between the U.S.-supported government and the FMLN set off a 
national-security alarm for the Reagan administration. In an effort to under 
cut a revolutionary movement and stop “communist” expansion, the U.S. gov 
ernment funneled massive military and economic assistance to El Salvador in 
the 1980s. Focusing just on economic aid, U.S. assistance rose quickly from 
$58.3 million in 1980 to peak at $462.9 million in 1987 and remained high 
until after the war concluded (see table 1.2). Total economic assistance to El 
Salvador in 1980-1993 topped $3.6 billion. Annual U.S. economic assistance 
averaged 6.5% of El Salvador’s GDP for the nine-year period between 1981 
and 1993, and exceeded 11% of GDP in 1985 and 1987. In both absolute and 
relative terms, U.S. economic assistance began earlier, peaked higher, and 
continued longer in El Salvador than in any other Central American country.
During the early years, under the leadership of Christian Democrat Jose 
Napoleon Duarte, who served as a member of the reformist civilian-military 
junta (1980-1982) and president (1984-1989), the Salvadoran government 
pursued several state-centered structural reforms intended to weaken the tra 
ditional agroexport elite (Johnson 1998; Segovia 2002,10-14). With techni 
cal and financial assistance from the United States, the government initiated
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agrarian reform, introduced state control of coffee and sugar exports, anc 
nationalized the banking system. This “communitarian” interlude, in which 
the government sought to increase state autonomy from traditional elites ano 
undercut FMLN recruitment, won few adherents in this increasingly polar 
ized country.
Duarte was soon pushed to reverse course by USAID, his principal ally and 
financial backer. Economic stabilization and reactivation emerged as central 
objectives when the war reached a plateau after 1985 (Rosa 1993; Segovia 
2002, 95-104). The United States conditioned aid on a currency devaluation 
designed to stimulate exports, leading to confrontation and eventual conces 
sion by the Duarte government. A stabilization plan was approved in 1986, 
followed by a 1987 program to develop nontraditional exports. Duarte, how 
ever, discontinued debt-service payments in the first part of 1989 as war re 
surged, and the World Bank and the IDB suspended loan outlays (Segovia, 
2002, 32, n43).
Duarte’s faltering attempts to slow or resist market reforms were swept 
aside with the legislative (1988) and presidential (1989) victory of the right- 
wing ARENA party. From its early association with anticommunist death 
squads, ARENA had emerged as a pro-business party that recruited leaders 
from among the economic elite. Its economic reform proposals were heavily 
guided by research and policy papers crafted by the Salvadoran Social and 
Economic Development Foundation (FUSADES), a Salvadoran think tank.
Created in 1983, FUSADES quickly became a major recipient of USAID 
funding. As in Costa Rica, USAID helped to build the institutional infra 
structure that would serve to advance market reform over time. Given financ 
ing of over $150 million between 1984 and 1993 (Robinson 2003, 90), FU 
SADES provided technical and ideological support for a slate of market 
reforms. Following the 1989 election of ARENA candidate Alfredo Cris- 
tiani (1989-1994), seventeen FUSADES leaders swept into economic minis 
tries, most in high-level positions (Segovia 2002, 30).23 Several had headed 
major business associations (Johnson 1998,143), blending business and policy 
credentials.
In addition to its role as a recruiting ground for ARENA economic minis 
tries, FUSADES’ Economic and Social Studies Department (DEES) played 
the lead role in policy development. With support from USAID, DEES 
tapped into an emerging pool of internationally trained economists and con 
tracted high-profile economic consultants to prepare the Cristiani govern 
ment program, Hacia una economia de mercado en El Salvador: Bases para una 
nueva estrategia de desarrollo economico y social (1989-1994). Prominent neolib 
eral economist Arnold Harberger played a critical technical and symbolic role
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in preparing the document (Vidal 2010, 93-97) and remained a long-term 
FUSADES affiliate.24
Over time, FUSADES developed greater internal technical expertise, and 
it contributed to economic plans for each of the three successive ARENA ad 
ministrations (FUSADES, Carta Informativa, April 2004). DEES recom 
mendations emphasized privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, and 
capital mobility. Exports were understood to drive growth in the global econ 
omy. Attention centered on competitiveness, and proposals drew on diag 
noses of problems provided by detailed surveys of the business sector.
As the war reached a stalemate and restructuring began, El Salvador 
entered into a series of discussions with the IMF. Between 1990 and 1998, 
the government signed six standby loan agreements, with thirty-four per 
formance criteria (Copelovitch 2010, 323). Unlike Costa Rica, where debt 
crisis and inflation were drivers for IMF engagement, El Salvador’s external 
debt stock was a relatively modest 49% of GNI, and the consumer price in 
crease was moderate and falling in 1990.25 Agreements made after 1990 with 
the IMF focused less on stabilization and more on increasing international 
recognition for the reform effort and quelling dissatisfaction among dissent 
ing elites (Segovia 2002).
Bank privatization and new export-promotion legislation were approved 
in 1990, followed by liberalization of prices, the exchange rate, charges for 
public services, and tariffs. Additional measures (Central Bank autonomy, 
creation of a stock market, and elimination of export taxes) were designed to 
attract foreign investment (Segovia 2002, 32, 37-40). As table 1.1 indicates, 
these market reforms boosted El Salvador’s structural reform scores, with 
sharp increases in 1993 and 1998.
The historic peace process, which ended the civil war in 1992, absorbed 
the FMLN into the political system but did not derail the marketization 
agenda. Although Cristiani ally and FUSADES founding member Roberto 
Murray Meza failed to get the ARENA presidential nomination for the 1994 
election, the essential neoliberal framework was not contested. ARENA can 
didate Armando Calderon Sol’s (1994-1999) election brought a push for 
additional privatization (of telecommunications and electricity). Economic 
leadership was conferred on Enrique Hinds, a former World Bank official and 
free market theoretician known for his advocacy of dollarization (see Hinds 
2006; Steil and Hinds 2009). Official dollarization was achieved under Fran 
cisco Flores (1999-2004), in the third ARENA administration. In spite of 
controversy about this policy, Flores announced the dollarization decision 
on November 22, 2000, and quickly pushed it through a compliant legisla 
ture. Implementation began only weeks later, on January 1, 2001 (Towers and
46 Contesting Trade in Central America
Borzutzky 2004). El Salvador’s national currency, the colon, soon in effect 
disappeared.
Export promotion, advanced with USAID support since 1984, was facili 
tated by the Ley de Reactivacion de las Exportaciones (1990) and deepened 
at the end of the decade with laws encouraging increased foreign investment 
(the 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion and Guarantee Law, 1998 Free 
Trade Zones Law, and 1999 Investment Law). The value of nontraditional 
exports surpassed that of traditional ones in 1991, a gap that widened over 
the decade. Coffee export value, already down to 5.4% of GDP in 1990, fell to 
0.7% of GDP in 2002 (Acevedo 2004, 351). The maquila sector, which pro 
vided investors a twenty-year tax exemption (PNUD 2003,133), rose quickly 
from modest beginnings to become a major anchor of the new economy 
Whereas maquila exports totaled $81 million in 1990 (1.7% of GNP), they 
increased to $1.76 billion (12.3% of GDP) in 2002 (Acevedo 2004,351).26 By 
2001, 86,000 Salvadoran workers were employed in 339 enterprises in the ex 
port processing zones (PNUD, 2003,129).
As elsewhere, neoliberal policy reform could hardly be sustained unless 
business activities reconfigured around the new model. The war era had bro 
ken the power of the traditional coffee elite, facilitating a shift in economic 
structure. Although land in the historically dominant coffee sector remained 
largely unaffected by the agrarian reform,27 agroexport production and distri 
bution processes were disrupted by fighting and labor displacement in the war 
zones. Production losses, capital flight, and self-exile hurt the coffee sector, 
and innovative Salvadoran agroexporters searched for new profits outside of 
agriculture. Fissures opened in the 1980s between the traditional agroexport 
elite and those shifting to an emerging industrial-financial sector, strength 
ening the latter and laying a groundwork for a change in the economic model 
in the 1990s (Paige 1998; Madrid 2009).
The 1990 bank privatization and 1992 peace process created opportuni 
ties for reformulated sectors of the Salvadoran elite to acquire interests in 
finance, commerce, construction, and real estate—areas that anchored a series 
of new economic groups. As suppliers and importers and through joint ven 
tures, businesses built links to transnational corporations. Segovia (2005) 
identified eight postwar corporate clusters in El Salvador, each with shares 
in multiple local and regional businesses (see also Madrid 2009). Two Salva 
doran business groups were anchored in the expanding banking sector (Banco 
Agricola and Cuscatlan), whereas others extended from their base in regional 
airline transportation (Taca), large hotel and mall development (Poma), and 
retail sales, storage, and real estate (Siman). Market opportunities throughout 
Central America facilitated cross-regional investment, and networked eco 
nomic groups began to redefine regional economic relations.28
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Salvadoran business elites developed various mechanisms that strength 
ened their access to political power. As elsewhere in the region, elites used 
their business associations as a mechanism to advance collective interests. El 
Salvador’s traditional business peak association, the National Private Enter 
prise Association (Asociacion Nacional de la Empresa Privada or ANEP), 
founded in 1966, expanded to include almost 40 chambers in the late 1990s 
(Johnson 1998, 139). As in Costa Rica, a chamber was created specifically 
to strengthen the organizational voice of the new export sector. Originally 
set up as a committee within the Association of Salvadoran Industry (ASI), 
the Corporation of Salvadoran Exporters (COEXPORT) split off to form a 
separate chamber with funding from USAID (Orellana Merlos 2005, fn. 5).
As ANEP expanded, chambers were added for nontraditional exporters, 
banking, real estate, construction, insurance and AMCHAM-E1 Salvador, 
which represented firms with U.S. investments or markets. These networks 
allowed association leaders to link internally with like-minded others and 
externally with dominant institutions. Nine of thirteen members of ASI’s 
1990-1991 board of directors, for example, also served on FUSADES execu 
tive committees (Johnson 1998,135).
In addition to these conventional mechanisms of interest representation, 
the Salvadoran business sector had direct access to state leaders through 
ARENA. Unlike many business elites, who steer away from visible parti 
san alliances for pragmatic reasons, the Salvadoran elite cultivated strong 
party ties. Three of four ARENA presidents (Cristiani, Calderon Sol, and 
Saca) hailed from the business elite, as did prominent members of the party’s 
governing board. A business identity percolated through the party structure 
and helped to define it. According to official biographical profiles reviewed 
by Koivumaeki (2010, 91-92), 26% of ARENA deputies in the 2006-2009 
legislative assembly self-identified as businessmen or businesswomen, and 
biographies of 40% of ARENA 2009-2012 mayoral candidates referred to 
their status as business owners. This close connection with the business sec 
tor provided ARENA with valuable strategic resources. Through financial 
contributions, public opinion leadership, and direct service as candidates, 
party leaders, and advisers, business elites played a critical role in the party’s 
twenty-year history of electoral victory (Koivumaeki 2010).
In the end, of course, electoral outcomes depend not simply on the views 
of business elites but on the voters. Pro-market ARENA presidential candi 
dates won four consecutive elections between 1989 and 2009, three of them 
in the first round of balloting (1989, 1999, and 2004). In conjunction with 
the PCN, a traditional, clientelistic party, ARENA also controlled the legis 
lative vote.29 The FMLN, which offered an alternative approach, remained a 
minority party.
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ARENA’S repeated victories suggest broad acceptance of market reform in 
El Salvador during this period. As in Costa Rica, electoral results affirming 
pro-market parties provide but one indicator of public approval; public opin 
ion polls provide a second. Although not all policies won support (dollariza 
tion was particularly unpopular [IUDOP 2004, 85]), the market system in 
general was widely endorsed. When asked in the Latinobarometro poll about 
their views on the statement, “The market economy is best for the country,” 
78% of Salvadorans indicated either strong agreement or agreement in 1998, a 
support level that surpassed even the high levels found in Costa Rica (Latino 
barometro 2009, 91).
Factors contributing to this outcome are undoubtedly complex. Desire to 
leave behind the trauma of civil war, combined with deep dependence on 
U.S. government aid and migration agreements, encouraged this view. Steady 
pro-market messaging in the conservative mainstream media probably con 
tributed, as did the portrayal of FMLN opponents as violent ideologues bent 
on destruction. In addition, general economic improvements encouraged a 
favorable assessment. Whereas average annual GDP growth during the war 
years 1981-1989 had been -0.9%, it increased to 5.2% as the war concluded 
in 1990-1997 (ECLAC, 2010d, 53). Although the growth rate declined to 
an average annual 2.6% in 1998-2003, most Salvadorans remained optimistic 
about the positive potential of this economic arrangement at that time.
Market Reform in Nicaragua
Market reform in Nicaragua advanced quickly following the 1990 electoral 
defeat of FSLN candidate and sitting president Daniel Ortega. The new 
president, Violeta Chamorro (1990-1996), who emerged at the helm of the 
14-party UNO coalition, brought an end to the turbulent Sandinista decade 
and shifted the country toward a market system. Over the next three admin 
istrations, market-friendly policies unfolded.
In the previous decade, the Sandinista Revolution (1979-1990) had estab 
lished a mixed economy that prioritized state-centered accumulation. Fol 
lowing the 1979 ouster of Anastasio Somoza, the revolutionary government 
seized the assets of the Somoza family and its allies, thus acquiring extensive 
agricultural holdings and a large network of industrial and commercial ac 
tivities. Private banks collapsed during the insurrection, and were replaced 
by state-owned banks. The new banking system modified credit distribution 
practices, improving access for small producers and domestic market crops, 
although in a financially unsustainable way. The government quickly assumed 
monopoly control over the export of major commodities, eliminating private
1
Lading firms, and imposed increasingly complex regulations on trade and 
•omestic transactions. As the decade wore on, other expropriations followed.
y the end of this era, about 30% of GDP was controlled by the state sec 
tor, and the private sector faced extensive regulation (Spalding 1987; Conroy
990; Martinez Cuenca 1990; Sola Montserrat 2007).
Limited state capacity, deepening internal polarization, and military pres- 
are prevented the Sandinista government from consolidating these reforms. 
Conflict with the Reagan administration fueled the “contra” war, which the 
•J.S. sponsored and financed. By 1987, the costs of the war absorbed 62% 
C the Nicaraguan government budget and 30% of GDP; the inflation rate 
oared, topping 33,000% in 1988 (Conroy 1990, 16; Rodriguez Alas 2002, 
8). Government efforts to stabilize the economy had only modest results, 
:nd living standards tumbled. With the economy contracting and the war 
ill not fully resolved, Nicaraguan voters chose a change of course in 1990.
The George H. W. Bush administration (1988-1992) funded Chamorro’s 
campaign and greeted her victory with a promise of assistance. During the 
ransition period preceding her inauguration, representatives from USAID 
nd the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, State, Treasury, and Commerce 
emulated a $300 million assistance plan designed to stabilize the country 
nd advance its economic recovery (GAO 1992, 9). Congress approved the 
ending in the 1990 Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, and 
’ SAID reassigned 1991 allocations to meet additional needs in Nicaragua.
: s in Costa Rica and El Salvador, U.S. support came largely in cash transfers 
hat financed “non-luxury” imports from the U.S. and Central America, sup- 
nrting a consumer boost during the Chamorro government’s early years. The 
•S. also provided $75 million to help clear the arrears on Nicaragua’s debts 
to the World Bank (unpaid since 1984) and the IDB (unpaid since 1987), to
How renewed lending from these organizations and the IME
U.S. economic assistance to Nicaragua, which had been negligible from 
?383 through 1989, jumped to a total of $443.9 million in 1990 and 1991 
Lnd $1 billion across the decade (see table 1.2). U.S. aid equaled a remarkable 
22.2% of Nicaragua’s GDP in 1990 and 14.7% the following year. The 1992 
GAO report on U.S. assistance provides a list of conditions governing the aid, 
vvhich included reducing government spending, re-establishing private banks, 
re-licensing private trading companies, privatization of state-owned enter 
prises, and contracting the size of the government workforce (GAO 1992,16).
Nine private banks quickly set up shop, and by 1995 they held over half 
°f all bank deposits (World Bank 1995, 26). State trade monopolies were 
eliminated in 1991-1992, and import tariffs were unilaterally reduced. Of the 
351 state-owned firms slated for divestiture, the government had privatized,
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liquidated, or transferred 233 by 1992. The central government Occupatior al 
Conversion Program provided a generous severance package (averaging 20 
months of salary) to those state workers who were willing to forfeit their jobs.
U.S. geopolitical concerns played the central role inUSAIDs rapid inter 
vention. This economic assistance was sometimes held hostage to political ob 
jectives, as the U.S. government moved to “desandinize” the Nicaraguan state. 
North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms secured a partial aid suspension in 1992, 
for example, over Chamorro’s failure to remove FSLN army chief Humberto 
Ortega, brother to the defeated president. USAID assistance to Nicaragua 
declined sharply after 1994 (see table 1.2), replaced by rising assistance from 
multilateral lenders. In spite of the drop off in U.S. aid, total official develop 
ment assistance from all bilateral and multilateral sources equaled $3.8 billion 
in 1990-1996, an annual average of 30% of GDP at that time (Sola Montser 
rat 2007,123).
Sustained, single-minded attention to economic reform was provided by 
the IMF, which renewed lending to Nicaragua in 1991 following massive de 
valuation and a series of policy agreements (Lacayo Oyanguren 2005, 201- 
202, 232-233, 239-245). Between 1994 and 2002, three multiyear structural 
adjustment loans were signed with the IMF. For the ten years between 2002 
and 2012, Nicaragua did not pass more than 15 months at a stretch without 
an IMF lending agreement in place.
In collaboration with the World Bank and with support from USAID, the 
IMF provided close supervision of Nicaraguan economic performance. Ac 
cording to a Government of Nicaragua (2000,14) report on structural reforms 
undertaken in the 1990s, public sector employment (including the armed 
forces) dropped from 285,000 to 89,000 between 1990 and 1999. The state 
banks retrenched, and BANADES, the main source of agricultural credit, 
sharply cut staff and branch offices before closing its doors in 1998 (Enriquez 
2010). Once the economy stabilized, the government moved to privatize the 
remaining state banks, telecommunications and electricity, and further liber 
alized trade under the second structural adjustment plan, which was launched 
in 1999 (IMF 1999; Sola Montserrat 2007,130-147).
The country periodically failed to meet budgetary benchmarks due to 
heavy debt obligations, natural disaster and political pressures, but policy 
change generally advanced along market lines, as Lora’s structural reform 
index indicates (see table 1.1). This transition took place in spite of the formal 
opposition of the FSLN and its continuing status as the country’s largest 
single political party. The rise of an entrepreneurial sector within the FSLN, 
which entered vigorously into the openings emerging under the new rules, 
raised complex questions about its role in the process.
Nicaragua’s foreign debt had increased from $1.6 billion in 1979, when the
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Somoza government collapsed, to $10.7 billion in 1990, and the debt rose fur 
ther to $11.7 billion in 1994. International lenders helped secure some debt 
forgiveness, repayment, and rescheduling for Nicaragua, but the total debt 
remained very high (Sola Montserrat 2007, 84, 125). Pressure from civil so- 
iety and some Western nations eventually pushed the World Bank and IMF 
to increase attention to debt relief. Under their subsequent Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, Nicaragua became a candidate for IMF 
monitored debt reduction. Progress was slow, however, and debt obligations 
still topped $6.6 billion in 2003, equal to 159% of GDP (BCN n.d., table 17).
The depth of Nicaragua’s economic crisis, foreign debt, and its exceptional 
dependence on aid gave external actors special leverage over this transition. 
But even in this case, market reform depended on the active cooperation of 
local officials who were responsible for day-to-day economic management. 
As in the other two Central American countries, technocratic officials im 
plemented the detailed schedule agreed upon with the international funders. 
Unlike Costa Rica and El Salvador, however, Nicaragua had undergone ten 
years of revolution. This experience had ruptured conventional technocratic 
ecruitment mechanisms in Nicaragua, and with the virtual disappearance of 
USAID during that period, no counterpart to Costa Rica or Salvadoran neo- 
iberal think tanks was in place.30
Nicaraguan technocrats who had left the country during the revolution to 
vork in international organizations and business or to pursue graduate de 
crees in the United States were now recruited back from self-exile to assume 
ugh-level administrative positions.31 Additional administrative support was 
provided by INCAE, a prominent Central American business school that 
oad transferred programs from its Managua campus to Costa Rica during the 
period of the Sandinista Revolution. After the 1990 election, INCAE’s Nica 
ragua program expanded and, with USAID financing, it took on technical 
Gaining responsibilities for key ministries. According to the 1991 GAO report 
U991, 21), 16 top technical advisers in the Central Bank, the newly formed 
Ministry of Economy and Development, and other economic agencies had 
INCAE affiliations. With $3.3 million in contracts from USAID, INCAE 
provided 33 consultants for government and private sector groups and had 
organized 54 seminars for over 2,000 public and private sector participants by 
March 1992 (USAID 1992, 3-4). Over time, other joint public-private agen 
cies and partnerships were created, such as the Export and Investment Center 
(Centro de Exportaciones e Inversiones, or CEI) and PRONICARAGUA, 
to promote trade and foreign investment (Gobierno de Nicaragua 1996).
Market transition produced some quick benefits. Inflation dropped sharply 
hom 13,490% in 1990 to 12% in 1996 (Sola Montserrat 2007,117), providing 
great and general relief. Economic growth resumed in 1994, after almost a
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decade of contraction. The average annual GDP growth, which in the 1980 - 
1989 revolutionary period was -1.4%, improved to 2.4% in 1990-1997 and 
3.5% in 1998-2003 (ECLAC 2010d, 53). Merchandise exports, which regis 
tered an average annual 3.8% decline in 1980-1989, grew an average annual 
9.4% in 1990-1999 (ECLAC, 2010e, 69), in part due to the expanding expon 
processing zones. Enjoying a 100% tax exemption for 10 years (and 60% there  
after) in Nicaragua, the number of EPZ companies increased from 5 (with 
a workforce of 1,000) in 1990, to 45 (with a workforce of 37,000) in 2001. 
EPZ manufacturing, which represented 1% of export value in 1990, contrib 
uted 54% of export value in 2001 (PNUD 2003 129, 133). Non-traditional 
agricultural exports became another source of growth, strongly encouraged 
by USAID.32
Market reform created winners and losers, and even in the new sectors, 
businesses often struggled. Rapid privatization and new regulations lacked 
transparency and allowed rent-seeking behavior, and well-placed investors 
moved quickly to extract gains (Mayorga 2007). Hardships associated with 
the loss of state bank credit and trade protection combined with evidence cf 
favoritism to weaken business cohesion around neoliberal adjustments (Spald 
ing 1994, 180-184; 1987). The gradual consolidation of the new economy, 
however, allowed the beneficiaries of economic opening to gain momentum 
and coalesce around market reform. As elsewhere in Central America, power 
ful economic groups coalesced, such as the Pellas and Lafise groups, some cf 
which built on an economic foundation dating back to the pre-revolutionary7 
period. The dominant economic groups quickly extended their investments 
across the region, many of them anchored in the rapidly expanding private 
banks (Segovia 2005; Mayorga 2007).
As new economic sectors began to emerge, business chambers reorganized 
around growth industries. New chambers were established in the banking, 
Free Trade Zone and tourism sectors; these associations allowed sectoral 
leaders to better coordinate around themes of common interest. As in Costa 
Rica and El Salvador, a specialized association for exporters, the Association 
of Nicaraguan Producers and Exporters (APEN), was created, with USAID 
covering its initial operating expenses (Spalding 1994, 185). By 2005, four 
new business chambers had affiliated with COSEP, expanding its coverage in 
tourism, fishing, food processing, and exporting (COSEP 2007). Improved 
relations with the United States restored trade and investment flows, foster 
ing rapid growth of the local AMCHAM (Gonzalez C. 2006).
Business support for the transition was reinforced by the polarized nature 
of Nicaraguan politics. After the clashes between business elites and the San 
dinista government in the 1980s, which resulted in censorship, prison terms, 
and property confiscations, many business association leaders developed
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a sharply adversarial relationship with the FSLN (Spalding 1994). Some, 
such as Enrique Bolanos, long-term head of the Superior Council of Private 
Enterprise (COSEP), the business peak association, eagerly sought political 
leadership in the post-revolutionary era. Electoral competition in 1990,1996, 
and 2001 pitted Daniel Ortega, as the perpetual FSLN candidate, against 
anti-Sandinista coalitions led by Chamorro, Arnoldo Aleman, and Bolanos, 
respectively. To ward off an FSLN victory, a steady majority of both elites and 
voters swung against the former revolutionaries, in favor of candidates seek 
ing normalized relations with the U.S. and the transition to market economics 
that this entailed.33
Across a sixteen-year period, Nicaraguan voters continued to reject the 
FSLN and elect presidents who pursued market reform. Chamorro, Aleman, 
and Bolanos all won the presidency with substantial majorities, in elections 
characterized by strong voter turnout.34 Much like their neighbors in Costa 
Rica and El Salvador, Nicaraguans accepted the market system in principle 
and expressed this support by voting for market advocates. Public opinion 
data reinforces the view that most Nicaraguans supported a general mar 
ket transition during this period. When asked, in the Latinobardmetro poll, 
whether “the market economy is best for the country,” 73% of respondents 
indicated approval (strongly agreed or agreed) in 1998, a figure that rose to 
78% in 2002, when it exceeded the Latin American norm by 19 percentage 
points (Latinobardmetro 2009, 91).
After the difficulties of hyperinflation, scarcity, and uncertainty com 
pounded the miseries of warfare in the 1980s, economic stabilization in the 
1990s was greeted with relief. The turbulent experience of “socialism” caused 
many to recoil from the economic insecurity associated with centralized con 
trols and U.S. hostility. External intervention brought high levels of foreign 
assistance to support transition, and, after a painful adjustment, economic 
growth resumed. Major development problems endured, and market reform 
brought its own set of problems, as we shall see, but the reigning perception 
was that the market system was the best alternative for the moment.
Interpretations
Close analysis of these three Central American cases demonstrates the use 
fulness of the multiphase theoreticalframework, in which the market reform 
process is broken into a series of steps and analysis focuses on the factors 
that shape its advance in each (see table 1.3). Three transition stages—initia 
tion, deepening, and persistence—involved varying combinations of actors 
and processes.
Table 1.3. Market reform processes: Multiphase theoretical framework
Phase Costa Rica El Salvador Nicaragua
Pretransition • Social democracy • "Communitarian" episode and civil war • Revolutionary regime
economic conditions • Debt crisis
• Economic contraction
• High inflation




External funders • U.S. geopolitical interests
• Sharp increase in USAID 
funding, followed by IMF and 
World Bank stabilization and 
structural adjustment
• U.S. geopolitical interests
• Sharp increase in and persistence of 
USAID funding, followed by IMF agree 
ment, but without sharp economic
crisis
• U.S. geopolitical interests
• Sharp increase in USAID funding, fol 
lowed by multiple IMF stabilization and 
structural adjustment agreements and 
by World Bank and IMF HIPC relief
Reform deepening
Domestic technocrats • USAID-funded public-private 
agencies and think tank 
development
• Local technocratic control of 
key ministries
• USAID-funded think tank development
• Local technocratic control of key 
ministries
• USAID-funded consultancies and tech 
nical assistance
• Local technocratic control of key minis 
tries, detailed IMF reform agenda
Business support • Rising power of exporters, 
tourism, commerce
• New economic groups
consolidate
• New business associa 
tions created, AMCHAM 
strengthened
• Rising power of banking, exporters,
commerce
• New economic groups consolidate
• New business associations created, 
AMCHAM strengthened
• Rising power of banking, exporters,
commerce
• New economic groups consolidate









• UNO and Liberal Alliance majority
• FSLN minority
Public opinion • Majority vote favors market 
advocates
• General public endorsement 
of market system
• Majority vote favors market advocates
• General public endorsement of market 
system
• Majority vote favors market advocates
• General public endorsement of market 
system
Outcome • Market reform: heterodox 
neoliberalism
Market reform: neoliberalism Market reform: neoliberalism, with sus 
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Reform initiation
Market reform is disruptive and accompanied by costs (Weyland 2002). As 
such, it is unlikely to be introduced unless local economic performance de 
teriorates and triggers a crisis, discrediting alternative approaches. The eco 
nomic crisis is commonly accompanied by strong bouts of inflation and may 
follow an extended period of contraction. In the Costa Rican case, market 
transition began with a foreign debt crisis that triggered rising inflation and 
placed pressure on the reigning social democratic system. In El Salvador, 
movement toward the market was fueled less by debt and inflation, which 
remained relatively modest, than by wartime polarization and production de- 
cline. Revolutionary Nicaragua experienced all of the above, with extreme 
debt and hyperinflation following a decade of war and economic contraction. 
By itself, however, economic decline does not necessarily lead to neoliberal 
reform. A production fall off would tend to foster change, but not necessarily 
of the market sort. For marketization to advance, other factors come into play. 
Polanyis (2001 [1944], 147) observation that “Laissez faire was planned” pro 
vides a useful point of departure.
As the general literature on market reform indicates, external funders 
often serve as a catalyst in this process. In the Central American case, the 
key external actor in the initiation phase was USAID. With greater agility 
than the multilateral lenders and more at stake in the region, the U.S. gov 
ernment responded quickly to the opportunity to project its influence in a re 
gion of geopolitical significance and to cure Central American ills with mar 
ket medicine. In all three cases, USAID provided massive funding, gradually 
imposing pointed requirements, including provisions to initiate negotiation 
with the IMF.
With a focused mandate, professional staff and training, and the ability to 
leverage additional resources through cross-conditionality, the IMF played 
a critical role in advancing marketization in this region. Its technical teams 
synchronized a timeline of reforms covering trade liberalization, privatiza 
tion, and deregulation. The market advance was hardly smooth in any of the 
cases, and lending sometimes stalled or was suspended, as in Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua. The agency’s legitimation function, however, enhanced the value 
of its approval, and the external financial flows it channeled made the pro 
cess less painful, hence more likely to be sustained (or renewed following 
interruption).
In contrast to findings that link IMF lending to shareholder maneuvers 
on behalf of major financial lobbies, USAID and IMF intervention in Cen 
tral America were not driven principally by core state financial interests. Un 
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ike larger Latin American countries with heavy borrowing concentrated in 
a handful of foreign banks, Central American foreign debts were generally 
modest in relation to bank portfolios and unlikely to affect bank profitability, 
(he Nicaraguan foreign debt, which was the most substantial of the three, 
was not primarily with U.S. banks; by the end of the Sandinista period, bor 
rowing came largely from socialist countries. Intense U.S. interest in these 
cases was more directly connected to the cold war fears of “communist” ex 
pansion in a region historically defined as the U.S. “backyard” than to pressure 
kom creditors. This catalyst gave neoliberal transition in Central America 
some distinctive features, including durable epistemic resource flows into 
meal think tanks and training programs, and unilateral, but temporary, mar 
ket access under CBI.
Reform Deepening
External funders could not secure a market transition unless local authorities 
actively cooperated in this venture. In the Central American cases, economic 
duress and war weariness fueled electoral transitions, and a new network 
of officials and technocrats emerged who endorsed policy change. Beyond 
imply signing onto the agreements reached with external funders, these offi 
cials provided on-going support for transition. Their numbers tended to in 
crease over time, as new government agencies and private partnerships were 
established, and they gradually populated the corner offices and cubicles of 
Key ministries. These officials came to serve as powerful norm entrepreneurs, 
reshaping the dominant ideas about how an economy should function.
Some who assumed technical leadership at the domestic level had long 
seen persuaded to abandon the old model, and were waiting in the wings 
for the opportunity to serve. Others had gone into self-exile or for gradu 
ate study abroad during periods of heightened statism, and had served stints 
as technocrats in multilateral banks and international business management. 
The change of leadership at home now offered a propitious moment to return 
and contribute directly to the economic revamping. Prior USAID institu 
tion building helped to foster the transition by providing training and net 
working opportunities for market-oriented actors. USAID financial support 
for the market friendly Academia de Centroamerica, CINDE and COMEX 
ln Costa Rica, for example, created a network of public and private insti 
tutions that would serve as local sponsors of marketization. FUSADES in 
El Salvador networked with international economic experts to design policy 
reforms, over time developing the expertise to complete policy planning in 
house. Market reform-oriented governments in Nicaragua drew on resources
available at INCAE, and nationals with foreign training and expertise staffed 
critical ministries in charge of finance, trade, and development.
Local bureaucracies, of course, were not completely replaced following 
election transitions, even when they were substantially downsized, as in Nica 
ragua. Market-oriented officials were often layered into agencies formed in an 
earlier era. Those public officials who failed to display sufficient confidence in 
liberalization, however, were commonly sidelined as inadequately prepared, 
anachronistic, and “politicized.” Through executive decrees, administrative 
rule changes, and hard-fought legislative battles, market reform policies were 
propagated.
Still, market transition requires more than the creation of a new policy 
framework. For the reforms to take root, producers and investors need to re 
spond to the unfolding opportunities and reorganize production processes— 
to become “flexible rent seekers” rather that intractable ones, seeking govern 
ment support under the new rules rather than insisting on the old. Because 
business elites tend to pursue concrete economic interests rather than an ab 
stract set of principles, their commitment to market reform can be variable. 
Privatization and deregulation provide ample opportunities for favoritism, as 
the general literature on market reform demonstrates, and insider allegations 
of corruption appear regularly in Central America. In this region too, market 
transition in practice deviated from market transition theory.
But over time, Central American business elites moved into the open 
ing sectors and successfully identified new markets. Once legal changes al 
lowed for the establishment of private banking, elites founded domestic and 
regional banks that anchored new economic networks in all three countries. 
The CBI opened markets in the United States for nontraditional products 
and local producers found niche markets. Real estate revived, sprawling malls 
sprang up, and, as the transportation and telecommunications infrastructure 
expanded, tourism, particularly in Costa Rica, became a new growth indus 
try. Importers relished the ease with which they could supply the expanding 
consumer market with foreign goods and brands.
One by one, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua developed new 
export-oriented manufacturing activities, distinctively tailored to local labor 
skills and costs. El Salvador and Nicaragua offered lowcost labor and secured 
jobs in the apparel sector; Costa Rica, where educational levels and salaries 
were higher, offered safety and quality control and secured investment in the 
computer and medical equipment sectors. Exports surged in each of these 
countries, albeit more slowly than imports, and foreign investment generally 
increased as well, albeit at widely varying rates. Traditional sectors, such as 
coffee cultivation, declined sharply in the new economy. Except in Nicaragua,
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the agricultural sector in general lost much of its significance. Business asso 
ciational life reconfigured around the new economy, with new chambers pro 
viding robust support for market reform, as some historical ones lost ground.
Reform Persistence
Political and economic elites can introduce market change, in cooperation 
with external allies, but in political systems that are formally democratic, 
those changes are unlikely to persist unless the new model secures public ac 
ceptance. Parties and candidates need to sell the virtues of market reform and 
to resist the temptation to backslide; voters must demonstrate some buy-in. 
Although endorsement of neoliberal reform was far from unambiguous in 
Central America, as subsequent chapters demonstrate, ideational processes 
stoked a new “common sense,” (Harvey 2005, 39-43) in which free market 
competition and global integration were widely understood to provide the 
only real road to modernity, and the means to leave instability, crisis, and 
warfare behind.
In Costa Rica, the formerly social democratic PLN and the Christian 
Democratic PUSC converged around the need for market efficiency and 
global integration, thus stabilizing market reform in spite of party rotation. 
Although leaders from these two parties tended to endorse market policies 
that went beyond public preferences, such as telecommunications privatiza 
tion, elites steered clear of the privatization of social services, and mass sen 
timent generally lined up behind the hybrid reform model that emerged in 
this country.
In El Salvador, pro-market ARENA enjoyed solid victories at the presi 
dential level, and its stable working relationship with a traditional clientelis- 
tic party generally provided the legislative support needed to advance a pro- 
market agenda. Ideological antagonism toward the opposition FMLN rallied 
even centrists, as ARENA discourse fanned fears of Left radicalism and the 
loss of U.S. aid.
Opponents of the FSLN in Nicaragua likewise benefited from ideological 
polarization, recruiting the anti-Sandinista vote in broad coalitions. Memo 
ries of the devastation associated with the revolutionary period tended to 
strengthen resistance to FSLN campaigns. Business leaders played an active 
role in these electoral victories; indeed, in El Salvador and Nicaragua, busi 
ness elites repeatedly vied for and won the presidency itself, and prominent 
business owners provided critical party leadership and financing.
The experience of revolutionary conflict and civil war in this region stiff 
ened the resolution of the Right and tilted the Center away from actors tarred
with the “socialist” brush. But voters could hardly be persuaded to endorse 
candidates and parties that ushered in market reform unless they associated 
these reforms with prospective opportunities and benefits. These perceptions 
were assisted by concerted ideational projects that emanated from elite insti  
tutions (think tanks, media), but they were not without material ground 
ing. The governments’ success in controlling inflation and restarting growth 
helped to make this case, as did their ability to secure foreign assistance, 
which allowed an import boom and increased availability of consumer goods. 
Positive attitudes toward a market system prevailed, even when these goods 
were out of reach for many and assessments of actual market impacts were 
mixed.
Central America entered the twenty-first century having undergone a neo 
liberal transition, with economies reorganized around trade and foreign in 
vestment, and national discourse focused on recovery and competition. These 
were the circumstances under which CAFTA was introduced.
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